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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TRANSSEXUAL LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL: GERMAN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DEMANDS REFORMATION OF LAW
BECAUSE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION
With the Broadway premiere of Hedwig and the Angry Inch (1998),
Germany assumed a prominent position in the cultural discussion surrounding
transsexuals.1 Based on the true story of an East German prostitute working as
a babysitter in Kansas, Hedwig relates the trials experienced by the victim of a
botched sex change.2 In a recent decision, Germany’s Federal Constitutional
Court3 addressed the problems of another sort of botched sex change: this time
a legal one. A transsexual had to choose between having his new gender
recognized under the Transsexual Law4 and remaining married to his spouse of
over fifty years. The court held that the country’s Transsexual Law was
unconstitutional because it required post-operative transsexuals seeking
recognition of their new gender to choose between two constitutionally
protected fundamental rights: individual integrity and marriage.5
Transsexuals have long played a role in gender and sexuality discourses,
but have proved vexing for legal contexts because the change in gender
represents a departure from a category that was traditionally immutable under
the law.6 The court in the present case attempted to find legal means for
1. See, e.g., Leslie Morris, Berlin Elegies: Absence, Postmemory, and Art After Auschwitz,
in IMAGE AND REMEMBRANCE: REPRESENTATION AND THE HOLOCAUST 288, 299 (Shelley
Hornstein & Florence Jacobowitz, eds., 2003).
2. RAYMOND KNAPP, THE AMERICAN MUSICAL AND THE PERFORMANCE OF PERSONAL
IDENTITY 252–53 (2006).
3. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is Germany’s highest court
for cases concerning constitutional questions. The court is discussed in greater detail in Section
IV. Translations are by the author of this Comment unless otherwise indicated.
4. Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der
Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Transsexuellengesetz—TSG] (“Law on the
Changing of First Names and the Establishment of Sex Status in Special Cases”) Sept. 10, 1980,
BGBl. I at 1654 [hereinafter TSG]. The law is commonly referred to as the “Transsexual Law”
(Transsexuellengesetz), and this Comment adopts the term accordingly.
5. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 27, 2008, 1
BvL 10/05, § 72, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20080527_1bvl00100
5.html.
6. See, e.g., BTDrucks 8/2947 at 8 (citing to Bundesgerichtshof decision from September
21, 1971, holding that a transsexual could not have a new gender recognized even after
undergoing gender reassignment surgery because there was no legal basis for such a change).
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addressing these changes in a fair and constitutional manner.7 This Comment
examines the existing law and the two legislative alternatives suggested by the
court, concluding that the court was right to demand changes to the law, and
arguing that the legislature should opt for the larger changes in order to address
multiple issues simultaneously. This study begins with an overview of
transsexual history and jurisprudence in Germany. Next, the Comment
presents the court decision and rationale. Third, the study analyzes European
Union guarantees of individual rights and their interaction with German law.
Fourth, it details German individual rights guarantees and their relationship to
the Transsexual Law. Finally, the note examines the consequences of the
court’s recommendations for legislative action and makes suggestions for
prudent reformation of the law.
I. HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY AND THE TRANSSEXUAL LAW IN GERMANY
The Transsexual Law took effect in 1980 in Germany following a decision
by the Federal Constitutional Court.8 The passing of the law was a significant
moment in transsexual rights in Germany that can best be understood as part of
a larger cultural and legal history. This section reviews the cultural history of
transsexuality in Germany, the development of transsexuality as a legal
concept in Germany, the 1978 court decision and subsequent enactment of the
Transsexual Law, and the further definition and codification of transsexual
rights through later German court decisions.
A.

Definition and History of Transsexualism in Germany

Transsexuality falls under the transgender “umbrella” in contemporary
academic discourse.9 The term transgender includes a number of loosely
related phenomena describing individuals who do not readily fit into the
traditional binary gender categories.10 In addition to transsexuals, more
common examples are intersexuals, transvestites, “gay drag, butch lesbianism,
and such non-European identities as the Native American berdache11 or the

7. BVerfGE 10/05, §72.
8. Volkmar Sigusch, Medizinischer Kommentar zum Transsexuellengesetz, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 2740, 2741–42 (1980).
9. Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS 3, 4 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the term transgender as an “umbrella”
term for gender dysmorphia and explores the history of the transgender umbrella concept
stemming from a 1994 Susan Stryker essay).
10. Id. at 3–4.
11. The berdache is the Navajo concept of “two-spiritedness,” reflecting both genders in one
person. See, e.g., Richard M. Juang, Transgendering the Politics of Recognition, in
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 242, 259 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

TRANSSEXUAL LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL

999

Indian Hijra.”12 As suggested by the variety of forms the term encompasses,
transgenderism is part of a continuum of gender, rather than a particular new
class of gender.13
Biological sex and, more recently, the social construct of gender typically
have defined the binary male/female classification system.14 Transgender
advocates support a more open understanding of sex and gender to reflect the
multiplicity15 of sex and gender constellations.16 The law has yet to adopt such
broad changes, but is increasingly willing to view the social consequences of
medical conditions17 as a basis for granting rights and changing laws.18
Definitions of “transsexual” vary by jurisdiction, but a typical understanding of
such codification of transsexuality in the United States can be found in a
Minnesota state anti-discrimination statute, which considers transsexuals as
“having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally
associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness.”19
Transsexuality can be defined in a number of ways, as noted above, but for
German law the concept20 must first be differentiated from other phenomena,
including homosexuality, transvestitism, and intersexuality.21 Under German
12. Currah, supra note 9, at 4 (quoting Susan Stryker, My Words to Victor Frankenstein
Above the Village of Chamounix: Performing Gender, GLQ 1:3 (1994)). The Hijra is an Indian
concept describing people perceived as eunuchs who do not fit into traditional gender categories.
See, e.g., Juang, supra note 11, at 259.
13. Currah, supra note 9, at 4; see also Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the
Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of
Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 273–278 (2005) (discussing transsexuality
as part of a “gender galaxy”).
14. Vade, supra note 13, at 261–62.
15. One list of transgender identities includes: “trans, tranny, trannyboy, trannygirl,
transsexual, transgender, shinjuku boy, boi, grrl, boy-girl, girl-boy-girl, papi, third gender, fourth
gender, no gender, bi-spirit, butch, dyke-fag, fairy, elf girl, glitterboy, transman, transwoman—
just to name a few.” Id. at 266.
16. Id. at 264.
17. Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve
Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & LAW 37,
53–54 (2000).
18. Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take it with You: Constitutional
Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L.R. 819, 835–39 (2005).
19. MINN. STAT. ANN. §363A.03(44) (West 2008) (This statute was renumbered from
§363.01); see also Currah & Minter, supra note 17, at 48–50 (discussing how different
jurisdictions incorporate gender identity and transgender into anti-discrimination and hate crime
legislation).
20. Even the simple act of speaking of a “concept” in the singular is problematic in the
context of transsexuals and the law. See Claudia Lohrenscheit & Anne Thiemann, Sexuelle
Selbstbestimmungsrechte—Zur Entwicklung menschenrechtlicher Normen für Lesben, Schwule,
Transsexuelle und Intersexuelle, in SEXUELLE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG ALS MENSCHENRECHT 15,
30–32 (Claudia Lohrenscheit ed., 2009).
21. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2743.
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law, homosexuality occurs when a person is attracted to others of the same
sex.22 Transvestitism, on the other hand, occurs when an “extended and
extensive” clothing or undergarment fetish exists.23 Distinguishing between
these phenomena and transsexuality does not typically present a problem under
German law.24 The law has greater difficulty separating transsexuality from
other psychological conditions, however.25
Transsexuality must be
distinguished from psychological conditions that may give rise to temporary or
otherwise borderline cases where a person expresses the desire to live as a
member of the other sex.26 In addition, transsexuals differ from intersexuals in
that the former experience a strong desire to live in the sex of which they are
not members, while intersexuals do not wish to change their sexual identity.27
Many intersexuals consciously wish to remain androgynous or to resist
aligning with traditional gender concepts.28 Under German law, transsexuals
differ from others in that they experience from early on a compulsion to live as
a member of the gender to which he or she was not assigned at birth.29
Although scientific analyses of transsexuality are a relatively recent
phenomenon, the understanding of the condition has developed greatly since
German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld30 first explained it in early twentiethcentury Berlin.31 As a result of Hirschfeld’s work, Germany was “at the
forefront of human sex change experiments” in the 1920s.32 Following the
groundbreaking research by Hirschfeld and his colleagues on transsexuality in
medicine, other German scientists and politicians have applied biological,
sexual, and gender criteria to address the various aspects of transsexuality in

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. ANJA SCHAMMLER, TRANSSEXUALITÄT UND STRAFVOLLZUG: DIE STÖRUNG DER
GESCHLECHTLICHEN IDENTITÄT VON STRAFGEFANGENEN ALS STRAFVOLLZUGSRECHTLICHES
PROBLEM 21 (2008).
25. Id. at 21–22.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 19.
28. Id.
29. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2742.
30. Hirschfeld (1868–1935) founded the “Journal of Sexual Science” (ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
SEXUALWISSENSCHAFT) in 1913 and the closely related Institute for Sexual Science in Berlin in
1919 to research transsexuality. Friedemann Pfäfflin, Sex Reassignment, Harry Benjamin, and
some European Roots, INT. J. TRANSGENDERISM 1, 2 (1997), available at: http://www.iiav.nl/
ezines/web/IJT/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijtc0202.htm.
31. See, e.g., STEFAN HIRSCHAUER, DIE SOZIALE KONSTRUKTION DER TRANSSEXUALITÄT:
ÜBER DIE MEDIZIN UND DEN GESCHLECHTSWECHSEL (1993).
32. Joanne Meyerowitz, Sex Change and the Popular Press: Historical Notes on
Transsexuality in the United States, 1930–1955, 4:2 GLQ: A JOURNAL OF GAY AND LESBIAN
STUDIES 159, 162 (1998).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

TRANSSEXUAL LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL

1001

different contexts.33 Such specialized, context-specific definitions, however,
do not generally suffice across the board: “Transgender people represent for
law a challenge of the notion of sex as naturally immutable, and therefore
serve to problematise [sic] the basis of gendered and heterosexual
subjectivities.”34
The Federal Republic of Germany (“West Germany”) defined its current
views on transsexuality as a legal concept in the “Transsexual Law” of 1980.
German lawmakers35 recognized the difficulty in fitting transsexuals into
traditional gender categories in creating the Transsexual Law, noting that the
existing expectation of “immutability of gender” was no longer “tenable.”36
That law refers to “[p]ersons who feel they belong to another sex than that of
their female or male bodily make-up.”37 This definition reflects physical,
social, and psychological dimensions in recognizing the phenomenon.38 The
legal recognition of the changes, however, is based entirely on medical
procedures and the resulting physical changes.39 A transsexual cannot petition
for recognition of a new gender unless he or she has experienced the desire to
live as a member of the other sex for at least three years.40 The application for
recognition of a new name or a new gender requires expert testimony in a
procedure that normally takes at least six months.41 In contrast to neighboring
Austria, which strictly limits medical treatment to a specific group of doctors at
the University of Vienna, Germany is relatively open in accepting opinions
from any qualified medical expert.42 The Transsexual Law details treatment of
transsexuals in civil matters.43 Criminal matters affecting transsexuals have

33. ANDREW N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE: DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAW 4
(2002).
34. Id.
35. The Transsexual Law is a federal law in Germany, unlike in the United States, where
each state creates its own provisions subject to federal constitutional limits. Greenberg & Herald,
supra note 18, at 823–24.
36. BTDrucks, supra note 6, at 8.
37. Friedemann Pfäfflin, Psychiatric and Legal Implications of the New Law for
Transsexuals in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 INT’L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 191, 192 (1981).
38. See id. at 198.
39. Id. at 194–95.
40. TSG §§ 1(1), 8(1).
41. C. Weitze, M.D. & S. Osburg, M.D., Empirical Data on Epidemiology and Application
of the German Transsexuals’ Act During Its First Ten Years, 2 INT. J. OF TRANSGENDERISM 1
(1998), available at http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/IJT/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijtc0303.htm.
42. Bundesministerium für Justiz, Mitteilung vom 20. Dezember 1996 über den Erlaβ des
Bundesministeriums für Inneres betreffend personenstandsrechtliche Stellung Transsexueller,
AMTSBLATT DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN JUSTIZVERWALTUNG (March 20, 1997), reprinted in
TRANSSEXUALISM IN EUROPE 32 (2000).
43. See generally TSG.
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been resolved on a case-by-case basis with reference to both the Transsexual
Law and the German Penal Code (“Strafvollzugsgesetz”).44
This definition encoded in the Transsexual Law is not the only legal
perspective German law has recognized, and historical context can provide
insight on the current case.
German scholars began addressing the
phenomenon of transsexuality on a large scale around 1910, and the first
“genital-retrofitting operations” took place in Berlin and Prague in 1912.45
The earliest work on transsexualism viewed the phenomenon as primarily a
physical condition manifesting itself in psychological terms.46 More recently,
the academic and legal communities have sought to address the social concerns
arising out of the medical/psychological condition, rather than treating some
unidentifiable physiological cause.47 Experts in Germany do not attempt to
“cure” transsexuality, instead viewing gender-reassignment surgeries48 as the
means for addressing both the medical condition experienced by the
transsexual and any related social issues.49 Experts rely primarily on the
presence of a number of symptoms in making their assessments and must
differentiate transsexuality from conditions such as homosexuality and
transvestitism in addressing patient and court requirements.50
Transsexuality in Germany today is viewed with an eye towards national
history and the persecution of transsexuals during the Nazi era, a time that—
not surprisingly—can only be viewed as disastrous for transsexual rights.51
The “Law for the Prevention of Genetically-Sick Offspring” was passed in
1933 and implemented with extreme efficiency following the Nuremberg Laws
of 1935.52 Under the law, hundreds of thousands were sterilized because they

44. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 65–196.
45. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2740.
46. Id. at 2741.
47. Although there have been significant refinements in the process, the scientific response
to transsexuality and the desire to have a sex change operation varies widely and is fraught with
difficulties even today. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 23-37 (2003).
48. A number of different procedures exist which fall under the category of sex-change
(gender-reassignment) surgeries. See Michael Sohn & Gereon Schäfer, Transidentität aus der
Sicht der plastisch-rekonstruktiven Genitalchirurgie, in TRANSSEXUALITÄT UND
INTERSEXUALITÄT: MEDIZINISCHE, ETHISCHE, SOZIALE UND JURISTISCHE ASPEKTE 131, 131–48
(Dominik Groß, Christiane Neuschuafer-Rube, & Jan Steinmetzer, eds., 2008).
49. Cathrin Correll, Im falschen Körper: Ein Beitrag zur rechtlichen und tatsächlichen
Problematik der Transsexualität, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3372, 3373 (1999).
50. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2742–43.
51. Friedemann Pfäfflin, supra note 30.
52. STEFAN MAIWALD & GERD MISCHLER, SEXUALITÄT UNTER DEM HAKENKREUZ:
MANIPULATION UND VERNICHTUNG DER INTIMSPHÄRE IM NS-STAAT 64 (1999). In German, the
law is called the “Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses.”

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

TRANSSEXUAL LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL

1003

were deemed “unworthy of reproduction.”53 The groups singled out for
sterilization included gypsies, Jews, invalid veterans from World War I,
homosexuals, and transsexuals.54 Nazi scientists working for SS-director
Heinrich Himmler even performed gruesome experiments designed to increase
their efficiency in sterilizing individuals.55 In addition to sterilization,
concentration camp researchers had a great interest in restoring sexual drives to
a “normal” heterosexual state and selected inmates for other studies, including
“hormonal repolarization.”56 In “repolarization” an artificial gland was
surgically implanted into the groin to change the patient’s sexual drive,
allegedly resulting in stronger and “better looking” inmates.57 As part of a
larger program, “repolarization” aimed to increase the nation’s reproductive
capacity by manipulating the patients’ sex drive.58 Such programs are now
widely condemned by officials: the persecution of homosexuals and other
individuals “living differently” is now commemorated and condemned by a
national monument in the German capital, Berlin,59 and a memorial square in
Vienna, the capital of Austria.60
With these social, medical, and cultural concerns in mind, the Federal
Republic of Germany attempted to address the social problems experienced by
transsexuals through the Transsexual Law in 1980.61 Since the introduction of
the Transsexual Law, Germany has seen increasing numbers of applications to
have new genders recognized.62 Estimates of the current transsexual
population in Germany range from around 8000 to 83,000.63 At the time the
law was enacted, the government estimated there were 7000 to 8000
53. Id. at 67. The German speaks of “Fortpflanzungsunwürdigkeit.”
54. Id. at 66–67.
55. Id. at 72–73.
56. GÜNTER GRAU, HOMOSEXUALITÄT IN DER NS-ZEIT 345 (1993).
57. Id. at 352–53. According to research reports, other inmates commented to the doctors on
the improvement in appearance of patients who had undergone such treatment. Id.
58. Id. at 346.
59. Kulturminister Bernd Neumann übergibt Denkmal für die im Nationalsozialismus
verfolgten Homosexuellen, PRESSE- UND INFORMATIONSAMT DER BUNDESREGIURUNG
PRESSEMITTEILUNG NR. 188, May 27, 2008, http://www.bundesregierung.de.
60. Mahnmal für homosexuelle und transgender Opfer des Nationalsozialismus auf dem
Morzinplatz—Hans Kupelweiser: Der rosa Platz, 2008, http://www.publicartvienna.at/picts/
Morzin_pressemappe_d_neu.pdf. See also Artistic Design: Memorial Commemorating the
Homosexual and Transgender Victims of the Nazi Regime at Morizplatz 2 (2008)
http://www.publicartvienna.at/picts/Morzin_pressemappe_e_neu.pdf.
61. BTDrucks 8/2947 at 1.
62. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41.
63. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 13–14. Estimates in respectable newspapers are as high
as 400,000, but academic studies suggests the number is likely much lower than that. Jan
Steinmetzer & Dominik Groß, Transsexualität in den Printmedien: Eine Analyse überregionaler
deutschsprachgier
Tageszeitungen,
in
TRANSSEXUALITÄT
UND
INTERSEXULITÄT:
MEDIZINISCHE, ETHISCHE, SOZIALE UND JURISTISCHE ASPEKTE, supra note 48, at 31, 34–35.
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transsexuals living in West Germany.64 This would correspond to 9000 to
12,000 individuals in contemporary unified Germany.65 Courts in the Federal
Republic of Germany had 1422 gender-recognition cases under the
Transsexual Law between 1981 and 199066 representing 1199 persons.67 The
male-to-female cases of gender recognition predominated by a ratio of 2.3:1.68
The average age of applicants was thirty-three, which may have been
artificially high,69 because the Transsexual Law initially required applicants to
be twenty-five-years old70 before their new gender could be recognized.71
Interestingly, some courts simply ignored the age requirement even before the
Federal Constitutional Court struck it down.72 On the other hand, there were
only six cases of “retransformation,” reversion to the original legal gender,
during this period.73
B.

German Court Cases Granting and Expanding Transsexual Rights

The Transsexual Law resulted from a Federal Constitutional Court
decision in 1978.74 The Constitutional Court reviewed a petition for
64. Plenarprotokoll (Plenary Protocol) Deutscher Bundestag 8/230 18683, 18687 (July 4,
1980).
65. This figure is an extrapolation from the government’s earlier estimate. The Federal
Statistical Office does not maintain statistics on the number of transsexuals in Germany nor on
the number of gender-reassignment applications. E-mail from Meike Kaspari, Statistician,
German Federal Statistical Office [Statistisches Bundesamt], to author (Nov. 14, 2008, 04:18
CST) (on file with author). An inquiry with the Ministry for Health [Bundesministerium für
Gesundheit] has gone unanswered.
66. No studies addressing the subsequent period exist, and the government does not keep
statistics. Id.
67. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41.
68. Id.
69. Transsexuals generally know early in life that they do not identify with the gender
assigned to them. In many cases, however, individuals do not or cannot change their status until
later dates. See Loree Cook-Daniels, Trans Aging, in LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER AGING: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 20, 22–23 (Douglas Kimmel,
Tara Rose, & Steven David, eds., 2006).
70. The law required applicants for the “Minor Solution” to be twenty-five-years old, but the
Federal Constitutional Court held that the age requirement does not apply to the “Major Solution”
because the medical operation required would in effect place the decisions in the hands of treating
doctors, rather than with the patient. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court] 1 BvR 938/81. See also I. GG Art I, 2 I, 3 I; TranssexuellenG §§ 1
I Nr. 3, 8 I Nr. 1 (Keine starre Altersgrenze für Personenstandsänderung eines Transsexuellen),
in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2061, 2061 (1982).
71. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41.
72. Id. The court decision striking down the age requirement receives more attention in Part
B of the Section.
73. Id.
74. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Oct. 11, 1978, docket no. 1 BvR 16/72, at juris online/Rechtsprechung.
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recognition of a new gender brought by a man who had undergone hormone
therapy and surgery and sought to be recognized as a woman.75 The petitioner
sought to have the new gender recognized to alleviate employment-related
problems in his (her) work as a nurse.76 The decision rested primarily on
constitutional grounds under the right to individuality in Article 1.77 The court
held that recognition of a sex change operation would not conflict with social
mores as long as it was “medically indicated.”78 Since the enactment of the
law, a number of court cases have led to expansion of transsexual rights on
constitutional grounds. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court
concluded that the law must apply without discrimination to both heterosexual
and homosexual transsexuals.79 The court also eliminated the requirement that
petitioners for gender recognition be at least twenty-five-years old as
unjustified unequal treatment of citizens under Article 3 of the Basic Law.80
Transsexuality is recognized as a medical condition, and as a result,
transsexuals now receive medical coverage for operations and related
treatment.81 In addition, the court has expanded the application of the law to
non-German nationals with a specified extended residency status in
Germany.82
C. Legislative Intent in Response to Constitutional Court Decisions
The Transsexual Law was designed to address the “social hardships” that
transsexuals in Germany had endured as a result of their gender.83 Legislators

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. I. GG Art. I, 2 I; PStG §§ 30, 46, 46a, 47 I (Änderung des Geschlechtseintrags im
Geburtenbuch bei Transsexuellen), in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, supra note 70, at
595, 595.
78. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Oct. 11, 1978, docket no. 1 BvR 16/72.
79. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Dec. 6, 2005, 1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVL] 3/03, available at jurisonline/
Rechtsprechung (holding that a homosexual transsexual who had had his name changed to a
female first name was allowed to retain the name under the “minor solution” of the Transsexual
Law after entering into a marriage with a woman).
80. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Mar. 16, 1982, docket no. 1 BvR 938/81 at jurisonline/Rechtsprechung.
81. Landessozialgericht [LSG Stuttgart] Nov. 27 1981, docket no. L 4 Kr 483/80.
82. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] July 18, 2006, 1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVL] 1/04 (holding in separate, combined
cases that a Thai man and an Ethiopian woman could have their new gender recognized in
Germany when their home countries would not allow such recognition). See Transsexuelle
erhalten mehr Rechte, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Nov. 8, 2006, at 7, available at 2006 WLNR
19336709.
83. Friedemann Pfäfflin, supra note 37, at 191.
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sought to achieve “lasting harmony of soul and body and conflict-free
integration in society” by allowing legal recognition of the new gender,
departing from the traditional “immutability” of sex.84 Legislators had to
address the issue in light of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision; but
they also wanted to avoid making it “too easy” for transsexuals by removing
“too many obstacles.”85 The Bundestag and Bundesrat had differing views on
the law, which eventually took on the contours envisioned by the Bundesrat.86
The Bundestag argued that the marriage of a transsexual seeking recognition of
a new gender would not need to be dissolved in advance, in order to avoid
unnecessary costs.87 Because the process of gender recognition would require
a significant amount of time and might not be successful, it was thought to be
risky to allow a married person to enter into the proceedings for gender
recognition, and require a divorce in advance, without knowing the result of
the gender status decision.88 The Bundesrat, on the other hand, concentrated
on the effect of the divorce on the other partner in the marriage.89 A divorce in
advance would allow the marriage partner to avoid the proceedings involved in
the recognition of the former spouse’s new gender.90 This prior separation was
believed both to spare the spouse and allow the transsexual partner to resolve
his “highly personal” matter unencumbered.91 This Bundesrat provision
requiring a petitioner to be single became encoded in the “Major Solution” of
the Transsexual Law, to be discussed in greater detail below.92
D. Structure of the Law
The Transsexual Law includes two options for transsexuals seeking to
have a new legal gender officially recognized. The “Minor Solution” involves
changing the petitioner’s name without altering the person’s legal gender.93
The “Major Solution” provision encompasses both a name change and legal
recognition of the new gender.94 This section discusses the two solutions in
turn and compares the requirements and ramifications of both.

84. BTDrucks 8/2947 at 8.
85. Pfäfflin, supra note 37, at 196.
86. BVerfGE 10/05, § 13 (quoting Deutscher Bundestag, 8 Wp., Plenarprotokoll v. 4. Juli
1980, 230. Sitzung, S. 18683, 18687 f.).
87. Id. § 11 (quoting BTDrucks 8/2947 at 6).
88. Id. (quoting BTDrucks 8/2947 at 6).
89. Id. § 12 (quoting BTDrucks 8/2947 at 21).
90. Id.
91. BVerfGE 10/05, § 12.
92. See infra at Part I.D.2.
93. TSG §1.
94. Id. §8.
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“Minor Solution”

Paragraph 1 of the Transsexual Law defines the “Minor Solution,” which
allows a person to take a new name in recognition of the individual’s act of
living as a person of the opposite gender.95 This provision changes the name,
but does not allow the new gender to be recognized in a legal sense.96 A
prerequisite for this option is living for three years under the new gender.97
The court must also determine that the individual will not change his/her
feeling of belonging to the respective other gender.98 Finally, the individual
must be a German citizen or resident under the Basic Law and meet certain
enumerated conditions listed in clause (3) of the paragraph.99 The new gender
(name) is recognized only by way of a court decision, which requires opinions
from two medical experts.100 An individual can move to have the name change
reversed.101 The name change can also be reversed involuntarily in certain
circumstances, such as if the individual has a child more than three hundred
days after the name change becomes official, or if the individual marries
again.102 The minor solution becomes automatically invalid if the petitioner
enters into a marriage following the recognition of the new name.103
2.

“Major Solution”

The “Major Solution” allows an individual who has undergone genderreassignment surgery to have his or her new gender recognized legally.104 This
option includes all of the requirements of the “Minor Solution,” including the
three-year period of living in the new gender.105 The “Major Solution” also
adds three additional provisions. First, the individual may not be married.106
Second, the individual must be “permanently incapable of reproducing.”107
Finally, the individual must have had surgery to achieve all of the outward

95. Id. § 1(1).
96. Id. §1.
97. Id.
98. TSG §1(2).
99. Id. §1(3).
100. Id. § 4(3).
101. Id. § 6.
102. Id. § 7.
103. TSG § 7(1)(3).
The Federal Constitutional Court has ruled this provision
unconstitutional in a separate decision, but it is unclear how the law will respond. See Peter A.
Windel, Transidentität und Recht—ein Überblick, in TRANSSEXUALITÄT UND
INTERSEXUALITÄT: MEDIZINISCHE, ETHISCHE, SOZIALE UND JURISTISCHE ASPEKTE, supra note
48, at 67, 77.
104. TSG § 8.
105. Id. § 8(1)(1).
106. Id. § 8(1)(2).
107. Id. § 8(1)(3).
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characteristics of the new gender.108 Unlike with the “Minor Solution,” there
is no provision for retracting the decision recognizing the individual’s new
gender, because gender reassignment surgery109 is irreversible.110 Because
marriage is not allowed, there is no provision to invalidate the new gender
recognition in the “Major Solution” of the Transsexual Law.111
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE
This section details the facts of the case and the court’s rationale. The
section concludes with an overview of the court’s suggestions for remedying
the constitutional defect in the current version of the Transsexual Law.
A.

Facts

In May 2008, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court declared the
country’s Transsexual Law112 unconstitutional.113 The petitioner114 was born
in 1929, and after fifty-six years of marriage (including three children), he
decided to undergo a gender reassignment surgery in order to live as a
woman.115 The petitioner stated unequivocally that he “had been a woman in a
man’s body since birth.”116 In accordance with relevant German law requiring
the use of a gender-appropriate name in order to have the new gender
recognized,117 the petitioner had been using a female first name since 2001.118
After receiving the requisite course of hormone therapy, the petitioner’s gender
reassignment surgery took place in 2002.119

108. Id. § 8(1)(4).
109. This note follows organizations such as the Transgender Law Center in using the term
“gender reassignment surgery” to reflect the goal of changing the gender category to which a
person belongs, thus addressing the social construct of gender. See, e.g., Medi-Cal and Gender
Reassignment Procedures, TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER (May 2002), http://transgenderlaw
center.org/pdf.MediCal%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
110. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2745.
111. See Windel, supra note 103, at 76.
112. Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der
Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen (Transsexuellengesetz), (September 10, 1980),
BGBl.I at 1654.
113. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] May 27, 2008, 1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVL] 10/05.
114. “Petitioner” refers to the person seeking recognition of a new gender in this discussion,
rather than the petitioner to the Federal Constitutional Court, which was the Berlin district of
Schöneberg. See infra note 128–30 and accompanying text.
115. BVerfGE 10/05, § 15.
116. Id. § 16.
117. TSG § 1.
118. BVerfGE 10/05, § 15.
119. Id.
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Following surgery, the petitioner sought to be recognized as a woman
under the “Major Solution” provision of the Transsexual Law.120 Under the
Transsexual Law, Germany recognizes the new gender only if the individual is
not married.121 The married couple here wished to remain married, citing their
long history and the petitioner’s psychological limitations, which resulted from
his abuse while living as a transsexual during the Nazi era.122 The petitioner
argued that fear and panic attacks would prevent the petitioner from living
apart from his wife123 for three years, as required under German divorce law.124
Financial limitations also allegedly prevented the couple from divorcing,
because they could afford neither to pay for the proceedings nor to maintain
two separate households, as required under German law.125 Finally, German
divorce law requires that a marriage be “damaged,” and here the couple did not
agree that this condition could be met, viewing a divorce as an “overwhelming
insult” in light of their over fifty-year common history.126 The petitioner was
seventy-two-years old at the beginning of the proceedings in 2002 and seventynine at their resolution in 2008.127
The desire to remain married set up a conflict between the petitioner’s
constitutionally guaranteed right to a self-determined gender identity and the
special protection guaranteed to marriage under a different constitutional
provision. The petitioner requested recognition of his new gender under the
Transsexual Law at the local administrative office.128 In response to the
petitioner’s request to remain married, the administrative office of Schöneberg,
a municipal district of the city of Berlin,129 sought review of the case by the
Federal Constitutional Court in August 2005.130 The court’s decision came
down on May 27, 2008131 and received wide media attention.132 But the legal

120. Id.
121. TSG § 8(1)(2).
122. BVerfGE 10/05, § 16.
123. Id.
124. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB][Civil Code] § 1566(2).
125. BVerfGE 10/05, § 16.
126. Id.
127. Sigrid Averesch, Ehe von Transsexuellen bleibt bestehen: Kein Scheidungszwang nach
Geschlechtsumwandlung, BERLINER ZEITUNG, July 24, 2008, at 6, available at 2008 WLNR
13752369.
128. BVerfGE 10/05, § 15.
129. Berlin is a so-called “Stadt-Staat,” a city that is simultaneously a state. WULF KOEPKE,
DIE DEUTSCHEN 179 (4th ed. 1993). This action arose in the district administrative office in
Schöneberg, which was acting on behalf of the state of Berlin (“Land Berlin”). BVerfGE 10/05
at Leitsatz. The “Landgericht” of the district in which the petitioner lives has jurisdiction over
TSG decisions. TSG § 2.
130. BVerfGE 10/05 at Leitsatz.
131. Id.
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community has not yet discussed the matter in detail, nor has the German
parliament decided how to resolve the constitutional dispute.133
B.

The Court’s Rationale

The court found the Transsexual Law unconstitutional, because the law
forced individuals to choose between protected fundamental rights.134 The
constitution guarantees135 that marriage is protected as a basic right,136 but the
constitution also guarantees individual integrity as a protected fundamental
right.137 The court found the law constitutional except for its marriage
provision and declared unconstitutional only TSG § 8(1)(2), the subparagraph
requiring that a person be unmarried in order to have his/her new gender
recognized.138 In reaching the decision, the court considered the law itself, the
German Basic Law, and several amicus briefs.139 The decision examined
whether the law was justified and proportional.140 For purposes of the
Constitutional Court’s analysis, a law is proportional if it is suitable,
appropriate, and necessary.141 The court’s analysis of these aspects will be
discussed in turn.
German courts view a law as “justified” if it is “borne by a legitimate
goal.”142 The court explained that legislators must recognize the “essential
structural principles” of marriage, which despite societal change includes only
the union of a man and a woman based on free will under the aegis of the
state.143 The court agreed with the Ministry of the Interior’s amicus brief144 on
the definition of marriage, concluding that because the Basic Law operates
under this understanding of marriage, the court must interpret the law

132. See, e.g., Averesch, supra note 127, at 6; Stefan Geiger, Gericht stärkt Rechte von
Transsexuellen: Karlsruhe erklärt den bisherigen Zwang zur Ehescheidung für
verfassungswidrig, STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG, July 24, 2008, at 18, available at 2008 WL
13750352; Es gilt die Ehe, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, July 24, 2008 at 6, available at 2008 WLNR
13741552; Gift transsexuell får kallas kvinna, SVENSKA DAGBLADET, July 24, 2008, available at
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/artikel_1485515.svd.
133. The Bundesrat has not reformed the Transsexual Law, but has officially decided not to
take action on the matter. BTDrucks 579/09.
134. BVerfGE 10/05, § 36.
135. See infra Part IV (for a discussion of constitutional rights guarantees).
136. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] May 23,
1949. Art. 6, ¶ 1.
137. GG Art. 2, ¶ 1.
138. BVerfGE 10/05, § 36.
139. Id. § 22.
140. Id. §§ 40, 46.
141. Id.
142. Id. § 42.
143. BVerfGE 10/05, § 45.
144. Id. § 23.
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accordingly.145 The law must balance the “special protection” of marriage and
“self-determined gender identity” provided by the Basic Law with the legal
construction of marriage provided by German law and societal norms.146 In
the contemporary legal context and under current law, the court concluded that
it is a legitimate legislative goal to prevent the combination of two persons of
the same gender in marriage under the Transsexual Law.147 The court closed
its initial discussion of justification with the cautionary note that even if the
Transsexual Law is justified, it must also be proportional “in its
formulation.”148
The court’s opinion does not discuss proportionality explicitly, but
concludes that the Transsexual Law is proportional in a broad sense.149 The
court discussed proportionality of the law in both its broad and narrow sense in
determining whether the law was suitable, appropriate, and necessary.150 The
court found the Transsexual Law was suitable to prevent marriages that give
the impression that two people of the same gender are married.151 The court
also found that the Transsexual Law was appropriate to meet the goal of
In its discussion of
limiting marriage to a man and a woman.152
appropriateness, the court also addressed the “Minor Solution” of the
Transsexual Law, which allows for a person to live as a member of the new
gender with a suitable name without legal recognition of the new gender
itself.153 The court recognized that the situation arising out of the “Minor
Solution” provisions of the Transsexual Law gives “the false impression” that
same-sex pairs can enter into marriage.154 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the marriage dissolution requirement is appropriate for achieving the
legitimate legislative goal of preventing marriage between same-sex
partners.155 The court’s analysis then turned from appropriateness to necessity,
a requirement the court also deemed satisfied.156
After examining the goals of the law, the court turned to its effects. Here
the court found that TSG § 8(2) is “disproportional in a narrower sense.”157
The court also rejected an alternative form of the law that the original

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
BVerfGE 10/05, § 42.
Id. § 49.
Id. § 46.
Id.
Id. § 46.
BVerfGE 10/05, § 47.
Id. § 46.
Id. § 47.
Id. § 46.
Id. § 49.
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legislation considered to be sufficiently mild toward the petitioner to justify
accepting that version of the law.158 This earlier alternative was to dissolve the
marriage automatically following the recognition of the new gender.159 The
court deemed that solution no better because it, too, failed to address the
deprivation of fundamental rights.160 As the court explained, individuals who
enter into marriage through “legally directed” means “enjoy the protection of
Art. 6 (1) of the Basic Law without limitation.”161 The court concluded that it
would be too much to ask to force a transsexual to give up his spouse, with
whom he is “bound” and “wishes to remain together,” without allowing him
the opportunity to continue the relationship in another, equally secure form.162
At the very least, marriage dissolution would mean that the former spouses
would have to live apart in order to comply with the law that requires a threeyear separation before a divorce is complete.163 This requirement serves to
establish that the marriage has truly “failed.”164 In the case of transsexuals,
however, the end of the marriage has nothing to do with the failure of the
marriage, but rather with the avoidance of same-sex marriages.165
Additionally, agreeing with the Federation of Lesbians and Gays,166 the court
emphasized that the Transsexual Law’s requirement that the petitioner be
unmarried affects not only the transsexual petitioner, but also the spouse.167
A forced divorce would deprive the existing marriage of its
constitutionally provided protection.168 Because marriage falls under the
protection of Article 6 of the Basic Law, the right to the protection of the
marriage is “unlimited.”169 The court reasoned that when the spouses do not
agree to forgo the protection of their marriage, the state cannot force them to
do so, because such a requirement would violate fundamental rights.170
C. Court Suggestions for Resolving the Conflict
In its decision, the court outlined two strategies the German parliament
could implement to meet constitutional requirements. First, the government

158. BVerfGE 10/05, § 49.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. § 58.
162. Id. § 49.
163. BGB § 1566.
164. BVerfGE 10/05, §54.
165. Id. § 55.
166. Id. § 29. In the original German this organization is the “Lesben- und
Schwulenverband.”
167. Id. § 56.
168. Id. § 57.
169. BVerfGE 10/05, § 58.
170. Id. § 59.
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could allow the transsexual’s marriage to continue in the same legal form—
that is, parliament could drop the unmarried requirement from the transsexual
law.171 The court deemed this option feasible because of “the minimal
number” of people in similar situations.172 Alternatively, the government
could allow the transsexual couple to continue the relationship in a life
partnership, provided that the new partnership retain all the rights the marriage
had offered.173 Until the legislators decide which path to pursue, the law will
not apply, and the couple in this case will remain married.174 Effectively, a de
facto same-sex marriage exists on an interim basis, because the petitioner is
now living as a woman.175 The court gave the government a grace period until
August 1, 2009 to enact a new law addressing the subject.176 Neither new
legislation nor discussion in official parliament sessions has taken place as of
January 13, 2010, and it is unclear when the legislature will address the law.
III. THE INTERACTION OF GERMAN AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW
The Transsexual Law is a German federal law applicable exclusively
within Germany. Nevertheless, in addition to German law and the German
constitution, the European Union Constitution and European Convention on
Human Rights determine some limits of the law’s application and ensure that
certain minimum criteria are met. This section provides an overview of
national laws from several European countries to place Germany’s law in
context. The analysis then shifts to the interaction of EU law with German law
to demonstrate that Germany’s law must acknowledge certain individual rights
in order to avoid running afoul of European constitutional principles.
A.

Survey of European Transsexual Laws

A number of strategies for addressing the legal gender of transsexuals
exist.177 Germany allows for legal gender changes and recognizes the new

171. Id. § 72.
172. Id.
173. Id. § 68.
174. BVerfGE 10/05, § 74.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 73.
177. An overview of the six main possibilities places the German solution in context and
illustrates some of the alternatives that the German legislature could have considered when
creating the Transsexual Law in 1980. First, the government could forbid sex change operations
and declare them punishable as grievous bodily harm. Friedemann Pfäfflin, supra note 37, at
192. This option does not allow for recognition of the new gender. Id. Second, sex reassignment
surgery can be forbidden, which also precludes the recognition of the new gender. Id. Third, sex
change operations can be permitted without recognizing the new gender. Id. Fourth, sex change
operations may be permitted and the new gender may be recognized. Id. The legal recognition of
the new gender may vary by individual case or by local jurisdiction. Id. Fifth, uniform legal
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gender fully under current law.178 This option is a more generous grant of
legal rights and certainty than in most countries.179 In Europe, the trend has
been toward increasing recognition of the post-operative gender of
transsexuals.180 Sweden enacted the first law allowing for legal recognition of
a new gender in 1972, followed by varying degrees of recognition in Germany
(1981), Italy (1982), the Netherlands (1985), and Turkey (1988).181
Recognition procedures vary greatly, from the systematic methods of Germany
and Austria to the lax case-by-case administration in countries like the former
Yugoslavia (now the independent nations Serbia and Montenegro).182 At least
thirty-three European countries now recognize reassignment of gender, and at
least twenty-two countries permit transsexuals to marry.183 But recognition of
a marriage legal in one country may not apply in other EU countries or outside
the EU.184 Many countries have enacted new laws in the area in recent years,
revising and broadening provisions on transsexuals to reflect societal trends.185
German legislators actively reviewed existing European law and other foreign
legislation when drafting the Transsexual Law in 1980.186 However, the law

provisions allow for the sex change operation and recognition of the new gender. Id. Finally, a
country may not officially acknowledge that transsexualism exists, thus making no mention of the
issue in its law. Id.
178. See TSG § 8.
179. See Friedemann Pfäfflin, supra note 37, at 192 (noting the numerous harsher
alternatives).
180. Frédérique Granet, Consolidated Report on Transsexualism in Europe, in
TRANSSEXUALISM IN EUROPE, supra note 42, at 9, 17.
181. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41.
182. See generally Marija Draskic, Yugoslavia: The Medico-Legal Issue of Transsexuality, 31
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 115, 121–25 (2000) (describing Yugoslavian law pertaining to transsexuals).
See also Svetlana Vujovic et al., Transsexualism in Serbia: A Twenty-Year Follow-Up Study, 6 J.
SEXUAL MED. 1018, 1019 (2008).
183. Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A Trans-Atlantic Judicial Dialogue, 12 LAW
& SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 87, 109 (2003).
See generally, European TransGender Network, “Country Survey: Civil Status” and “Country
Survey: Right of Name” (2005), available at http://tgeu.net under “Documents” (surveying the
requirements for right of name and civil status in various European countries).
184. See generally Barbara E. Graham-Siegenthaler, Principles of Marriage Recognition
Applied to Same-Sex Marriage Recognition in Switzerland and Europe, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV.
121 (1998) (comparing the marriage laws of various European countries using Switzerland as a
reference point).
185. Germany is an example that certainly applies here, as this note illustrates. See also
María Elena Lauroba Lacasa, El derecho de familia en España, hoy: del matrimonio indissoluble
al matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, 75 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 935, 1001–05 (2006)
(detailing key Spanish legislation that has broadened its provisions regarding transsexuals in
accordance to cultural trends throughout Europe).
186. BTDrucks 8/2947 at 9–11.
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has not been revised in a major way since then, even as laws across Europe
have changed.187
B.

EU Law and Its Interaction with German Law

EU law places limits on German federal law by way of human rights
guarantees. States acceding to EU membership, including Germany, agreed to
the fundamental guarantees of personal liberty included in the EU
constitution.188 The EU constitution provides that neither segregation nor
limitation of “individual liberty” may exist in member countries.189 Germany’s
Federal Constitutional Court has also recognized that the protection of basic
rights has assumed a fundamental position no longer subject to review under
national standards.190 The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (“Convention”), which can be
viewed as an “accessory constitution,” established the minimum standards for
basic rights.191 In the EU, the Convention guarantees as fundamental the rights
to family life and individual integrity.192 Article 8 of the Convention states
that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,” and that
“[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right.”193 Article 12 declares, “[M]en and women . . . have the right to marry
and found a family, according to national laws governing the exercise of this
right.”194 The restriction included in Article 12—“according to national
laws”—proves critical in this context. National law governs marriage and
family law; but human rights can be expanded on the basis of European
constitutional guarantees.195 When Germany enacted the Transsexual Law in

187. See generally TSG.
188. Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutional Principles for Europe, in RECENT TRENDS IN
GERMAN AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: GERMAN REPORTS PRESENTED TO THE
XVIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, UTRECHT, 16 TO 22 JULY 2006, at
1, 9 (Eibe Riedel & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2006).
189. Id. at 8–9.
190. See Ralph Alexander Lorz, Emergence of European Constitutional Law, in RECENT
TRENDS IN GERMAN AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: GERMAN REPORTS PRESENTED TO
THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, UTRECHT, 16 TO 22 JULY
2006, at 37, 50 (Eibe Riedel & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2006).
191. Id. at 56 (explaining that an “accessory constitution . . . is and remains a treaty under
public international law but a special one: because it is able to have a direct impact on the
constitutional orders of its member states”).
192. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), in
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 30, 33 (1975).
193. Id. There are some exceptions to this right, such as protection of health or morals. Id.
194. Id. at 34.
195. Lorz, supra note 190, at 56.
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1980, for example, legislators referred to a 1979 European Commission on
Human Rights.196
EU efforts to draft laws on transsexual rights provide one avenue for
addressing the legal status of transsexuals.197 For example, the International
Commission on Civil Status198 attempted to create European law in 1999 with
the “Convention of the International Commission on Civil Status on the
Recognition of Sex Reassignment Decisions and Explanatory Report Adopted
by the Lisbon General Assembly on 16 September 1999.”199 The Commission
expressed the desire to “foster the recognition on their territory of decisions
recording a person’s sex reassignment, taken in another contracting state.”200
The Commission explicitly left the laws regarding civil status and
consequences of the recognition of a new gender to the member states and only
sought to expand recognition among member states of the new status granted
in the home country.201 The recognition provisions take effect in member
states only upon ratification by member states.202 Germany has not yet ratified
the convention.203 Such limited efforts at achieving a modicum of recognition
across borders have done little to expand fundamental rights for transsexuals,
even where they were ratified.204
European court decisions have proven more effective in forcing expansions
of rights in many member states under national rights laws in a transition from
sex-based to gender-based legal classifications.205 The 1970 United Kingdom
case Corbett v. Corbett illustrates the older paradigm against which later cases
reacted.206 In Corbett, a married male-to-female transsexual sought divorce
196. BTDrucks 8/4120 at 13.
197. See generally Convention (N˚ 29) of the International Commission on Civil Status
(ICCS) on the Recognition of Sex Reassignment Decisions and Explanatory Report Adopted by
the Lisbon General Assembly on 16 September 1999, in TRANSSEXUALISM IN EUROPE, supra
note 42, at 67 [hereinafter Convention] (exemplifying this sort of drafting effort).
198. “The ICCS is an intergovernmental organization comprising the following states:
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom.” Granet, supra note 180, at 9
n.1.
199. See generally Convention, supra note 197.
200. Id. at 68.
201. Id. at 73.
202. The ratification is required under Article 5. Id. at 69.
203. Commission Internationale de l’Etat Civil, Liste des conventions CIEC,
http://web.lerelaisinternet.com/CIECSITE/ListeConventions.htm (last visited March 20, 2010)
(Convention listed in French original and unofficial English translation. Under Convention 29,
select link leading to German translation noting the provision has not been adopted).
204. See generally Convention, supra note 197.
205. Berrigan, supra note 183, at 87–108 (recounting the case law that explains the
development of European law transsexual rights from an exclusionary medical definition to the
current broad grant of social rights).
206. Id. at 91.
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from her husband, who knew she was a transsexual and nevertheless had
married her.207 The English court held that the marriage was void because the
wife had been born as a male and sex was determined at birth.208 The court
explained that the wife was a male because she had male chromosomal cells
and that her outward appearance was a mere “pastiche of femininity.”209 The
court found that biological sex is fixed at birth and cannot be changed.210
Corbett dominated the legal discourse211 on transsexuality until 2002,212 when
the I v. United Kindgom court “dismissed Corbett from the dialogue.”213 The I
court held that transsexuals had the right to have their new gender recognized
under Art. 8 and the right to marry under Art. 12 of the Convention.214 The
court cited “major social changes” in its holding, brought about by increased
acceptance of gender identity disorders in the medical and scientific
community.215 The court felt that society should “tolerate a certain
inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance
with the sexual identity chosen by them at great personal cost.”216
Although their early grants were limited in scope, European courts long
ago began extending rights to transsexuals, deciding as early as 1976 that
transsexuals could rely on Directive 76/207 for its protections against gender
discrimination in the employment context.217 Such positive protection of rights
did not necessarily translate into broad interpretations of secondary law,

207. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83, 88 (H.L.).
208. Id. at 106.
209. Id. at 104.
210. Id.
211. See Rees v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986)
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (expanding transsexual rights by allowing that courts
would need to interpret individual rights “in the light of current circumstances”). Following Rees,
transsexuals could still be denied recognition of their new gender under Art. 8 protection of
individual integrity. Id. at 42. But the court opened the door to further change in its twelve-tothree decision. Id. at 51. See also Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 8 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 45, 40, 48 (1990) (expanding on the Corbett position again by holding ten-to-eight that
transsexuals did not have the right to have their new gender recognized under Art. 8). The court
in Cossey noted “the need for appropriate legal measures concerning transsexuals should be kept
under review. . . .” Id. at 40.
212. Berrigan, supra note 183, at 91.
213. Id. at 107–08 (citing I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94 (2002), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng.
214. I v. United Kingdom, at 73, 83–84.
215. Id. at 80.
216. Id. at 71.
217. Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L. 39/40) 5 (EC). See also Heather Lardy and
Angus Campbell, Discrimination against Transsexuals in Employment, 21(5) EUR. L. REV. 412,
412 (1996) (discussing a case where the court considered whether dismissal of a transsexual for a
reason related to his or her reassignment).
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however.218 England, for example, was reluctant to extend health benefits to
persons seeking gender reassignment surgery.219 This view was rejected in
Van Kück, though, when the European Court of Human Rights held that health
insurance providers were required to pay for gender reassignment surgery as a
treatment for a medical condition.220 The court justified this conclusion on the
basis of individual integrity rights under Art. 8 of the Convention.221
In Van Kück, individual integrity was defined as the basic essential of selfdetermination,222 and the court noted that the constitution created a positive
duty to actively enforce this right.223 The court found that the right to “sexual
self-determination” was one aspect of the petitioner’s right to respect for her
private life.224 The court also found that a presumption existed that persons
were justified in undergoing sex-change operations because they related to
“one of the most intimate areas of private life . . . .”225
Recent European case law tends to be more receptive to transsexuals than
to homosexuals in the marriage context, to the extent that national family law
now explicitly addresses transsexuals.226 The traditional image of marriage as
between one man and one woman dominated European jurisprudence on
marriage rights until at least 2000.227 Since then, the European Court of
Human Rights has found that denying transsexuals the right to marry a person
of their former, pre-operative gender would violate the right to marry.228
Decisions granting broader rights to transsexuals than homosexuals could
reflect the difficulty implicit in addressing a legal change in a context not
adapted to such categorical changes, but it is more likely that this position
arises from financial concerns.229 An internal EU consulting document

218. Liv Jaeckel, The Duty to Protect Fundamental Rights in the European Community, 28(4)
EUR. L. REV. 508, 516 (2003).
219. Lesley-Anne Barnes, Gender Identity and Scottish Law: The Legal Response to
Transsexuality, 11(2) EDIN. L. REV. 162, 177 (2007) (citing R. v. West Lancashire Health Auth.
ex p. A, D & G, [2000] 1 WLR 977).
220. Van Kück v. Germany, App. No. 35968/97 (2003) available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
eng.
221. Id. at 88.
222. Id. at 73.
223. Id. at 71.
224. Id. at 78.
225. Van Kück, at 82.
226. Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella & Annick Masselot, Under Construction: EU Family
Law, 29(1) EUR. L. REV. 32, 42 (2004).
227. See generally Emily Reid & Eugenia Caracciolo Di [sic] Torella, The Changing Shape of
the “European Family” and Fundamental Rights, 27(1) EUR. L. REV. 80, 84 (2002) (providing an
example of a court’s adherence to the traditional view of marriage in early 2001).
228. See, e.g., Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, 48
(2002).
229. Di [sic] Torella & Masselot, supra note 226, at 42.
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estimated that if it provided equal benefits to same-sex partners, the staffing
costs for its employees alone would increase to € 1,537,000 for
accommodation allowances with a general total of € 4,491,000 on an annual
basis.230 The equal treatment of transsexuals, in contrast, would have “limited
financial implications.”231
IV. GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND THE TRANSSEXUAL LAW
In addition to the rise of the EU constitution, events in both German and
world history have led to several major breaks in the constitutional
development of today’s Federal Republic of Germany. The end of World War
II led to the formulation of the Basic Law (“Grundgesetz”), unified Germany’s
current constitution, which was enacted in 1949 as a provisional document in
anticipation of the unification of the separated German states.232 The East
German Constitution was adopted in 1949 as well, and the two documents
governed concurrently until the two German states united in 1990.233 The
constitutions set very different priorities, and a brief overview of them is
necessary to explain the Basic Law and the constitutional principles in effect
today. This section begins by examining the West German Basic Law, then
moves to the East German Constitution, before concluding with a discussion of
the constitution (“Basic Law”) in contemporary united Germany.
A.

German Constitutional Priorities in the Post-War Era

Following World War II, Germany had to reconfigure its legal system as
part of the de-Nazification of the country.234 This was complicated by the fact
that the Western powers occupying the Federal Republic of Germany were
pursuing different priorities than the Soviet-dominated German Democratic
Republic, a fact reflected in the differing constitutions of these two
countries.235 Specifically, in the area of human rights and individual liberties,
West Germany offered broader protection of individual integrity.236 Because
the two German states unified after the passing of the Transsexual Law in West
Germany in 1980, a brief overview of the differences between the constitutions
and the principles adopted following unification is necessary to gain a precise

230. Id.
231. Id.
232. SABINE MICHALOWSKI & LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 5 (1999).
233. Id.
234. Marten Burkens, The Federal Republic of Germany, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 15 EU
MEMBER STATES 307, 311–12 (Lucas Prakke & Constantijn Kortmann eds., 2004).
235. Id. at 312.
236. Inga Markovits, Constitution Making After National Catastrophes: Germany in 1949
and 1990, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1307, 1311 (2008).
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understanding of exactly what constitutional guarantees played a role here.237
This section reviews the constitutional guarantees of rights in both West and
East Germany, and follows by analyzing the constitutional law issues resulting
from the synthesis of those two states.
The state that later came to be known as West Germany adopted the “Basic
Law,” its equivalent to a constitution, on May 23, 1949.238 The Basic Law
drew heavily on experiences under National Socialist rule.239 In addition to
many other atrocities, the Nazis had introduced legislation to criminalize and
force the sterilization of certain groups, including transsexuals, who were
deemed to be “damaging to the people.”240 This oppressive history led to the
inclusion of strongly worded guarantees of fundamental rights in the new Basic
Law, to be discussed in greater detail below.241 Conservative predecessor laws
on marriage and the subordinate role of women in Germany’s Civil Code may
also have led in part to the strong sense of equality in the new Basic Law.242
Unlike in the West, “[d]uring the making of the first East German
Constitution of 1949, the past seemed absent.”243 Communist East Germany
viewed itself as a victim of Nazi atrocities and was more interested in
transforming the future than addressing past wrongs.244 Nevertheless, the
Constitution of 1949 guaranteed basic rights and even included a provision to
protect the substance of the basic rights from apparent restriction by any law,
including the constitution itself.245 As this protection of protections suggests,
the Constitution of 1949 was more concerned with theoretical rights than
actual application and protection of individual liberties.246 The Constitution of

237. Id. at 1343.
238. GG at Eingangsformel.
239. Blanca Rodríguez Ruiz & Ute Sacksofsky, Gender in the German Constitution, in THE
GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 149, 149 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin
eds., 2005).
240. STEPHEN WHITTLE, RESPECT AND EQUALITY: TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS, 161, 161 n.1 (2002).
241. Id.
242. MARGARET BARBER CROSBY, THE MAKING OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION: A SLOW
REVOLUTION 260–61 (2008).
243. Markovits, supra note 236, at 1314.
244. Id.
245. Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [Constitution of the German
Democratic Republic] [GDR] October 7, 1949 Art. 49. See also Markovits, supra note 236, at
1318.
246. Markovits, supra note 236, at 1320–21.
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1949 also guaranteed basic rights of gender equality for males and females247
and the protection of marriage.248
Following German reunification in 1990, the Basic Law was amended and
adopted for use throughout the territory of the enlarged Federal Republic of
Germany.249 Although some laws from East Germany took effect in united
Germany, East Germany did not have legislation addressing recognition of
new gender in transsexuals.250 This meant that the Transsexual Law and all
related human rights provisions in the Basic Law were adopted throughout
what was formerly East Germany.251 Consequently, subsequent constitutional
interpretations of the Transsexual Law need not refer to East German
provisions on transsexual rights.
B.

Guarantees of Individual Civil Rights in Germany

Under the German constitution, certain rights are non-derogable and
cannot be changed by the legislature under any circumstances.252 The
constitution enumerates these rights in Article 79(3), which states that any
restrictions on Articles 1-20 are “disallowed.”253 Articles 2 and 3, which
provide for the protection of individual integrity and gender equality, are
included in the protected provisions.254 Article 6, covering the protection of
family and marriage rights, is also considered a non-derogable right.255 The
rights to marriage and individual integrity came into conflict in the present
case and this note discusses them in turn.
German family law expressed in the Basic Law and its understanding of
marriage developed from Germanic tribal law positions on marital status.256
These earlier views tended to create a form of concubinate, which, perhaps

247. GDR Art. 7. This right was later incorporated into the Constitution of April 6, 1968 in
Art. 20(2).
248. GDR Art. 30. This right was also later incorporated into the Constitution of April 6,
1968 at Art. 38.
249. Markovits, supra note 236, at 1333.
250. See Burkens, supra note 234, at 314 (discussing the application of the West German
Constitution to East Germany following unification and the grace period during which East
German departures from newly imposed fundamental rights would continue to be tolerated).
251. See id. (indicating that after the end of the grace period on December 31, 1995, the Basic
Law, and its attendant freedoms, would preempt any conflicting former East German laws).
252. HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 180 (2008).
253. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution], May 23,
1949, as amended, art. 79(3).
254. Id. arts. 2, 3.
255. Id. art. 6.
256. Eva Marie von Münch, Rechtsprobleme nichtehelicher Lebensgemeinschaften, in
FRAUEN IM RECHT 25, 37–38 (Ulrich Battis & Ulrike Schultz eds., 1990).
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unsurprisingly, developed primarily on the basis of property laws.257 Modern
law added religious characteristics to the mix, recognizing the role of
Christianity in German society.258 Marriage under church auspices was
legitimate only if deemed acceptable by the church.259 The civil marriage
developed in response to this phenomenon as a marriage under control of the
State beginning in 1875.260 The German Basic Law developed its protection of
marriage in this historical context.261
Germany has struggled in finding adequate solutions to the conflict
between constitutional protections of marriage and efforts to prevent
discrimination against same-sex couples in creating a partnership that does not
disturb the special role of marriage.262 The Federal Constitutional Court now
reads the State’s duty to protect marriage differently to allow the two
partnership forms to coexist under the Constitution.263 The court had long
operated under the belief that it had a “‘duty to privilege marriage in
comparison to other legal institutions.’”264 Now the court adopts the view that
“‘the constitution allows positive discrimination in favour [sic] of marriage but
does not oblige the legislator to do so.’”265 The German federal government
eliminated most discriminatory provisions from the Lebenspartnergesetz (“Life
Partner Law”) in 2004, although it maintained separate terminology for some
phenomena to differentiate between marriage and same-sex partnerships.266
Some minor differences remain in other areas as well, such as maintenance
rights.267 Now that the prohibition on common adoption by same-sex partners
has been eliminated,268 the primary exceptions to equal rights are pension
rights and major tax differences.269
Gender integrity is guaranteed under Articles 2 and 3 of the Basic Law,
which provide for gender equality and recognition of the right of self-

Id.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Ruiz & Sacksofsky, supra note 239, at 160.
MASHA ANTOKOLSKAIA, HARMONISATION OF FAMILY IN EUROPE: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 419–20 (2006).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 419 (quoting K. Thorn, The German Law on Same-Sex Partnerships, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN EUROPE 85 (K. Boele-Woelki & A. Fuchs eds., 2003)).
265. Id. at 420 (quoting K. Thorn, The German Law on Same-Sex Partnerships, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN EUROPE 86 (K. Boele-Woelki & A. Fuchs eds., 2003)).
See also Bundesverfassungsgericht, July 17, 2002, NJW 2543–48.
266. ANTOKOLSKAIA, supra note 262, at 420–22.
267. Id. at 422.
268. Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz [Life Partner Law], Feb. 16, 2001, § 9. For a discussion of
adoption in the context of the Transsexual Law, see BTDrucks 16/4148 at 7.
269. ANTOKOLSKAIA, supra note 262, at 422.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
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determination of the individual.270 German courts were indifferent to these
provisions with regard to sexual discrimination until the early 1990s, but have
since taken a more proactive role in enforcing equal treatment on the basis of
gender.271 German courts have enforced gender equality based on biological
differences rigorously under Article 3(3) of the Basic Law since the 1970s.272
The courts view such differential treatment as discriminatory.273 These
principles are anchored in the area of transsexual rights by European court
decisions,274 as well, which have refined the German constitutional definition
of individual integrity regarding transsexual rights.275
C. Conflict Resolution and Court Rationalization for Differentiating
Marriage and Unions
When rendering decisions on fundamental rights, the Federal
Constitutional Court weighs the interests of the affected individual against the
interests of society.276 Germany follows the legal principle recognizing both
lex generalis and lex specificis, meaning that analysis of a particular event
must consider both the specific provisions of a narrow statute and the broader
concepts of general laws and the Constitution.277 German Constitutional Court
decisions rely on an underlying “value system” for interpreting individual
provisions of the law.278 The Court can weigh the values of the respective
rights at stake against each other in proceedings on constitutional norms, but it
cannot restrict the rights in any way.279 The Court may declare a law
unconstitutional in whole or in part.280 Alternatively, the Court can require the

270. BVerfGE 1 BvL 10/05 (§§ 19, 21). See also GG arts. 2, 3 (guaranteeing rights of free
expression and bodily integrity (Article 2) and gender equality (Article 3), respectively).
271. Ruiz & Sacksofsky, supra note 239, at 151.
272. Id. at 152–53.
273. Id. at 153.
274. German courts do not always refer to European court decisions, but the Federal
Constitutional Court has established the so-called “take-into-account” requirement, meaning that
German court decisions must acknowledge European law and court decisions and incorporate
them into the German system. Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad & Anne Weber, The Reception
Process in France and Germany, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 107, 131–37 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
275. See, e.g., Van Kück v. Germany, App. No. 35968/97, Eur. Ct. H. R. (June 12, 2003).
276. Burkens, supra note 234, at 359.
277. Florian Wolff & Felix Prozorov-Bastians, Introduction to German Business Law:
General Private Law, in GERMAN TAX AND BUSINESS LAW 1001, 1029 (2005).
278. Burkens, supra note 234, at 316. The Federal Constitutional Court weighed the value of
rights in the “monitoring decision” on the legality of recording of private activities by the state,
for example. Id.
279. Id.
280. MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 232, at 43–44, 48.
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legislature to amend the law following Court guidance.281 The latter option
purports to maintain the separation of government by leaving the final choice
on statutory development with the legislative branch.282 The deciding principle
is ultimately always reducible to a fundamental right protected by the Basic
Law, as governed by Article 19.283 The present case involved a so-called
“review in concreto,”284 which is a proceeding considering the compatibility of
a state law with federal law.285 Such proceedings arise under Article 100 of the
Basic Law.286
German law forbids discrimination among different members of likesituated groups.287 But current readings of the Basic Law permit the so-called
“furthering principle” for protected groups.288 In other words, the government
may give preferential treatment to a particular group, but it may not treat a
group worse than others.289 This policy appears to be pure discrimination on
its face, but the Federal Constitutional Court views this differently and
explained its position with respect to marriage in a 1980 case.290 In that case,
the court held that the state has “a positive obligation to . . . support marriage,”
and that it is prohibited from “harming or otherwise impairing” marriage as an
institution.291 The court allows different treatment of civil unions and marriage
under its positive duty of support.292 Here, however, the court decision
allowing the petitioner’s marriage to continue reflects the minimum rights
requirements of the German Basic Law and European law guaranteeing
individual integrity and the protection of marriage.293

281. Id. at 43–44.
282. Id.
283. Burkens, supra note 234, at 360.
284. BVerfGE 1 BvL 10/05, § 17. The German for this term is “konkretes
Normenkontrollverfahren.” Burkens, supra note 234, at 356.
285. Burkens, supra note 234, at 356.
286. GG art. 3.
287. Id. art. 1.
288. KLAUS TIPKE & JOACHIM LANG, STEUERRECHT 134 (2008). See also MICHALOWSKI &
WOODS, supra note 232, at 46.
289. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 134.
290. BVerfGE 10/05, § 50.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. The court considers the right of transsexuals to marry in the present case, BVerfGE
10/05, and also in the 2005 case requiring that both homosexual and heterosexual transsexuals be
allowed to enter into civil partnerships. Id. § 52 (citing BVerfGE 1 BvL 3/03).
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V. COURT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO RESOLVE THE
CONFLICT
The Federal Constitutional Court set the Transsexual Law aside as a result
of the constitutional conflict it forced on the petitioner.294 The court offered
legislators two means for solving the constitutional problem in the law,
allowing until August 1, 2009 to meet the requirement.295 This section reviews
the two options separately, explains the consequences of each possibility, and
concludes by making recommendations on legislative action.
A.

The “Minor” Resolution

The court suggested the legislature could solve the constitutional conflict
by simply striking the marriage requirement from the Transsexual Law.296 If
both partners entered into a legal marriage, they could remain married
following recognition of the new gender even if the marriage would give the
impression that two members of the same sex were married.297 This option
would allow same-sex marriages to exist in the small number of cases where
the married couple wished to remain together.298 This solution, which requires
fewer changes to existing law, is the logical and consistent extension of the
Article 6 protection of marriage.299
B.

The “Major” Resolution

Alternatively the court suggested that the legislature could allow the
marriage to continue in the form of a civil partnership with all of the rights
associated with marriage.300 This option would require changing the
Transsexual Law in a minor way to reflect the new partnership form.301 More
importantly, this strategy would require reconfiguring the laws on civil
partnerships available to same-sex partners.302 A same-sex partnership as
suggested by the court with all of the rights of marriage would differ from
marriage only in a semantic sense.303 Because the court does not specify what
such a partnership would need to include, legislators would need to decide to

294. Id. (Leitsatz).
295. Id. § 73.
296. BVerfGE 1 BvL 10/05, § 72.
297. Michael Grünberger, Die Reform des Transsexuellengesetzes – Großer Wurf oder kleine
Schritte?, TRANSSEXUALITÄT UND INTERSEXUALITÄT supra note 48, at 81, 105.
298. Transsexuals make up about 0.004% of the population, and many of that small minority
will not be or remain married. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41.
299. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 106.
300. BVerfGE 1 BvL 10/05, § 71.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 105.
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whom the law would apply, i.e., whether to create a new form of partnership to
apply only to transsexuals or to expand civil partnerships to everyone to meet
the court’s requirements.
C. Consequences of Each Option
The legislature was required to enact a new version of the Transsexual
Law by August 1, 2009.304 The two options presented by the court differ
greatly in their effect on both transsexuals and others. An exhaustive list of all
of the differences associated with the two alternatives to the current law would
go well beyond the scope of this article;305 but selected important areas of law
provide a useful framework for discussing the advantages and shortcomings of
the two solutions. This section focuses on tax and pensions; inheritance; and
health care provisions in German law, with limited mention of other significant
effects arising from the Transsexual Law.
1.

Tax and Pensions

Under the policy of supporting marriage, the court permits different
treatment of married couples and civil partnerships for tax purposes.306
Income tax treatment of couples differs most significantly with regard to
income splitting,307 which is allowed only for married couples in Germany.308
Income splitting is optional at the taxpayer’s discretion, but not available in the
full form to unmarried couples.309 Under current readings of Art. 6 of the
Basic Law, the government is obligated to “positively” protect marriage.310
This would not preclude extending splitting to unmarried and same-sex
couples, but the introduction of income splitting for same-sex couples in
Germany has proved problematic because it would require extending the
benefits to unmarried couples under Article 6.311 Although the government is
required by the Basic Law to protect marriage, legislation does not need to
protect all life partnerships, even if there is clear tax discrimination.312 In the
case of income splitting, the court has concluded that this tax inequality is not a

304. BVerfGE 1 BvL 10/05, § 73.
305. For a thorough treatment of relevant issues in the US context, many of which also apply
in some variation in Germany, see Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731
(2008).
306. MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 232, 247–48.
307. Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Law], Oct. 19, 2002 BGBl I, at 4210, §§
26, 26a, 26b, 26c, available at juris online/Rechtsprechung.
308. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 134.
309. EStG § 26c.
310. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 134.
311. Id. at 135.
312. Roman Seer, Das Ehegattensplitting als typisiertes Realsplitting, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR
WILHELM HEINRICH KRUSE 357, 372–74 (Walter Drenseck & Roman Seer eds., 2001).
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form of tax favoring, because it merely reflects the “average marriage” by
including in splitting the amount of income which two individuals would be
able to deduct from income as a standard nontaxable basis income.313
Presently, the nontaxable basis income is € 52,152 per person pear year, or €
104,304 per married couple per year.314 This nontaxable income clearly favors
married couples where the individual taxpayers have differing amounts of
income.315
The Transsexual Law does not address tax treatment of transsexuals
explicitly, but it does consider the right of a transsexual to receive pension
benefits following recognition of a new gender.316 Transsexuals who have had
their new gender recognized do not have the right to receive “pension plans
and other similar regularly recurring payments” stemming from the
relationship with the former spouse.317 For tax purposes, a double penalty
results: transsexuals receive neither a pension from their former spouses, nor
the tax benefit318 of splitting for separated spouses and those spouses who lead
separate households long-term.319
2.

Inheritance

Germany is one of many European countries to differentiate between
heterosexual and homosexual partnerships in inheritance matters.320 German
law distinguishes between categories of heirs in determining tax liabilities on
inheritances.321 The taxation categories are assigned to relatives and nonrelative heirs on the basis of relationship proximity, with a clear preference for
inheritance within a family.322 Under the Transsexual Law, the parent-child
relationship remains intact, including for inheritance tax purposes.323 But the
surviving partner of a married couple receives significant tax benefits
compared to the surviving partner of a life partnership or an unmarried
couple.324 For a surviving spouse, the tax begins at 7% of the inheritance for

TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 407.
Id. at 133–34.
Seer, supra note 312, at 374.
TSG § 12(2).
Id.
EStG § 10 I Nr. 1.
TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 368.
NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 119 (2008).
321. Erbschaftsteuergesetz [ErbStG] [Inheritance Tax Law], Feb. 27, 1997, BGBl I at 378, §
19.
322. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 173–74.
323. TSG § 11.
324. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 524.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
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up to € 52,000 and peaks at 30% for sums over € 25,565,000.325 For same sex
partners and many unmarried partners, the tax begins at 17% for sums up to €
52,000 and peaks at 50% for sums over € 2,565,000.326 Unmarried partners
may also fall in between these two in certain circumstances.327 Despite
awareness of different taxation for different life partnerships,328 legislation in
December 2007 that updated329 the inheritance tax did not address the
classification of same-sex and unmarried partners for tax purposes.330
3.

Healthcare

The Transsexual Law provision requiring unmarried status has little, if
any, direct effect on health care among the partners to a marriage or civil
union.331 Under the 2001 German Life Partner Law, partners of a civil union,
popularly known as “homo-marriage,” have a duty of care identical to that of
heterosexual marriages.332 This duty may extend beyond the duration of the
civil partnership if the parties dissolve the partnership.333 Partners have the
right to share household insurance, visit each other in the hospital, and act as
next-of-kin in medical decisions.334 In the case of divorce, the Life Partner
Law applies the same provisions of the Civil Code Book335 to civil
partnerships as to dissolved marriages, including the right to financial support
from the former partner.336 Because the duty of care and support for
homosexual partnerships are the same as for traditional heterosexual

325. ErbStG § 19, I.
326. Id.
327. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 524.
328. Id.
329. The effects of these changes in the tax laws are still unresolved in some respects at the
administrative level, but same-sex and unmarried partners are not affected by unresolved
questions. See, e.g., Harald Plewka, Die Entwicklung des Steuerrechts, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 3410, 3414–15 (2009) (describing recent inheritance tax reform without
mentioning changes affecting same-sex partnerships).
330. ErbStG § 15(1).
331. For an overview of potentially affected issues, see Emilia Lombardi and Talia Bettcher,
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender/Transsexual Individuals, in SOCIAL INJUSTICE AND
PUBLIC HEALTH 130, 134 (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel eds., 2006).
332. Gesetz über die Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft [LPartG] [Life Partner Law], Feb. 16,
2001, BGBl. I at 266, last amended by Gesetz, Dec. 21, 2007, BGBl. I at 3189, § 2, available at
juris online/Bundesrecht.
333. Id. § 16.
334. Jes Kraus, Monkey See, Monkey Do: On Baker, Goodridge, and the Need for
Consistency in Same-Sex Alternatives to Marriage, 26 VT. L. REV. 959, 982 (2002).
335. The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch is the primary collection of laws relating to private civil
matters, such as identification cards. See OTTO PALANDT, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Peter
Bassenge et al. eds., 2008).
336. LPartG §§ 16, 20.
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marriages, health provisions would remain unaffected by the two solutions
offered.
4.

Other Issues

Other issues come into play in laws addressing transsexuals, many of them
extending far beyond the limited scope of the Transsexual Law.337 For
example, either army or civil service is required of German males.338 This
service duty does not extend to females.339 Transsexuals are excused from this
compulsory service as well, including female-to-male transsexuals, who in
theory would be required to serve in their new gender.340 For military service
purposes, marriage and civil partnerships also figure into the equation, because
individuals who are married or living in a civil partnership are excused from
military service.341 Criminal law plays a role, as well, including the housing
and work assignments of transsexual prisoners.342 In addition, prisoners have
the right to receive visitors, but this right may be limited by local prison
rules.343 Visits by nonrelatives may be restricted with greater ease than visits
by relatives, including spouses.344 Visits may be conditioned on constant
supervision.345 The new Transsexual Law needs to address these issues.346
Concerns also arise in employment law, family law, and health care law
relating to sex-specific treatments, and in other contexts.347
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the court’s recommendations
do not go far enough to right other wrongs in the Transsexual Law itself.
Although the court’s suggested laws do acknowledge the gender recognition
337. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 41–43.
338. Wehrpflichtgesetz [WPG] [Military Service Law], Sept. 16, 2008, BGBl. I at 1886, § 1,
available at juris online/Rechtsprechung.
339. Id.
340. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 43 n.168.
341. WPG § 10(1).
342. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 65–175. One noteworthy example is the so-called “Pink
Giant,” a man currently undergoing hormone therapy in preparation for gender reassignment
surgery—with the hope of subsequent release. The “Pink Giant” is a 6’, 6” former police officer
who, among other things, murdered five women and a baby between October 1989 and April
1991. The former “Wolfgang” now goes by “Beate” in the prison where he has been living and
interacting regularly with other inmates since 1992. Der sechsfache Mörder von Beelitz erhält
eine Hormonbehandlung, um eine Frau zu werden, MÄRKISCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, August
6, 2009, http://www.maerkischeallgemeine.de/cms/beitrag/11575978/62249/Der-sechsfacheMoerder-von-Beelitz-erhaelt-eine-Hormonbehandlung.html.
343. Gesetz über den Vollzug der Freiheitsstrafe und der freiheitsentziehenden Maßregeln der
Besserung und Sicherung (Strafvollzugsgesetz) [StVollzG] [Penal Law], March 16, 1976,
BGBl. I at 581, § 24.
344. StVollzG § 25.
345. Id. § 27.
346. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 195–96.
347. Id. at 43.
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issues implicit in transsexual operations, they do not address the underlying
eugenics question that remains under the law’s non-fertility provision.348 As
described above, the National Socialist regime sought to eliminate transsexuals
and other groups it deemed undesirable by sterilizing them.349 The petitioner
in the present case suffered at the hands of the Nazis because of his
transsexuality.350 Following in that ignoble tradition, the Federal Republic also
demands that individuals seeking recognition of their new gender be
permanently infertile.351 Although transsexuals are generally infertile, it is not
always the case.352
Why the government has retained the infertility requirement is not readily
apparent,353 particularly in light of recent government efforts to condemn354
past eugenics efforts aimed at eliminating homosexuals and other “sexual
deviant persons” under the “hereditary health law.”355 In addition to such
social policy concerns, the infertility requirement likely also conflicts with
Article 2 of the Basic Law,356 which protects the right to physical integrity of a
person’s body.357 It is unclear how the government can reconcile granting
rights to medical treatment to transsexuals on the basis of their right to
individual integrity358 while simultaneously denying transsexuals the right to
reproduce and invading their bodily integrity by requiring their infertility.359
Finally, recent changes in law on adoption and civil partnerships for
homosexuals have rendered the original purpose of the infertility provisions
redundant.360 The legislature intended to prevent transsexual couples from

348. TSG § 8(1)(3).
349. See, e.g., Friedemann Pfäfflin, The Connections Between Eugenics, Sterilization and
Mass Murder in Germany from 1933 to 1945, 5 MEDICINE & LAW 1, 2–4 (1986).
350. BVerfGE, decision of May 27, 2008, docket number 1 BvL 10/05, § 16, available at
juris online/Rechtsprechung.
351. TSG § 8(1)(3).
352. Stephen Whittle, Gemeinschaftsfremden—or How to Be Shafted by Your Friends:
Sterilization Requirements and Legal Status Recognition for the Transsexual, in LEGAL
QUEERIES: LESBIAN, GAY AND TRANSGENDER LEGAL STUDIES 42, 43–44 (Leslie J. Moran,
Daniel Monk & Sarah Beresford eds., 1998).
353. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 106.
354. See, e.g., Press Release, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregiurung
Pressemitteilung Nr. 188, Kulturstaatsminister Bernd Neumann übergibt Denkmal für die im
Nationalsozialismus verfolgten Homosexuellen (May 27, 2008), available at
http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_774/Content/DE/Archiv16/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2008/05/
2008-05-27-bkm-mahnmal-hohenschoenhausen.html.
355. Pfäfflin, Sex Reassignment, supra note 30.
356. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 103.
357. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution] art. 2, ¶ 2
(F.R.G.).
358. See Van Kück v. Germany, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22–25.
359. TSG § 8 (1)(3).
360. Deutscher Bundestag Innenausschuss Protokoll 16/31 at 36.
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giving the impression that same-sex couples were in a union with children.361
Such situations are now possible, eliminating the professed justification for the
infertility requirement on that ground, as well.362 In the present case, the court
did not reach the infertility provision, because the petitioner only addressed the
marriage requirement.363 The legislature would do well to address both points
in reformulating the law.
D. Recommendations
The legislature must eliminate the discriminatory treatment of transsexuals,
which the court recognized in the present case.364 This change would meet the
minimum guidelines set out by the court and also promote equality. This
remedy is most easily achieved by simply removing the clause requiring
transsexuals be unmarried to have their new gender recognized, thus allowing
the same-sex marriage to continue;365 but legislators should also consider
future ramifications of the law affecting homosexuals and civil partnerships in
Germany. Discrimination remains in that area of the law, as described
above,366 and the simple removal of the “unmarried” requirement from the
Transsexual Law will allow those provisions to continue denying basic rights
to large portions of the population.367 The State argues that this requirement is
justified by a “positive duty to protect” marriage as between a man and a
woman.368 Obvious discrimination against same-sex couples is not justified in
light of recent German and European cultural, legal, and medical
developments, however.369
Legislators have also argued using the idea of medical necessity regarding
their positions on transsexuality.370 It is unclear whether the law can provide
positive protection to the physiological condition experienced by transsexuals
without extending those rights to the equally scientifically verifiable condition

361. Id. at 37.
362. Id.
363. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 104.
364. BVerfGE, decision of May 27, 2008, docket number 1 BvL 10/05, § 49, available at
juris online/Rechtsprechung.
365. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 105.
366. See supra, notes 305–63 and accompanying text.
367. Transsexuality, as a sexual identity rather than sexual orientation, compels a greater
grant of rights than homosexuality, thus allowing the discrimination against homosexual couples
to continue. See Windel, supra note 104, at 69.
368. BVerfGE, decision of May 27, 2008, docket number 1 BvL 10/05, § 50, at juris
online/Rechtsprechung: Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
28, 1980, 53 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] 224 (F.R.G.).
369. See generally di Torella & Masselot, supra note 226, at 41–43.
370. BTDrucks 8/4120 at 1, available at http://dip.bundestag.de.
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experienced by homosexuals.371 That issue is particularly problematic in light
of the possibility of marrying under current provisions that homosexual
transsexuals and transsexuals opting for the “Minor Solution” have372—
contrary to the legislative intent of avoiding the appearance373 of same-sex
marriage.374 Same-sex marriage stemming from transsexual rights may be the
next legal challenge faced on marriage rights in Germany. In the present case,
the court does not require sweeping changes. Guaranteed constitutional rights
and fundamental fairness, on the other hand, would require them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court rightfully struck down the Transsexual Law because it required a
choice between two fundamental personal rights guaranteed by the German
constitution. The Basic Law clearly states that the rights of individual integrity
and marriage affected by the Transsexual Law are fundamental and therefore
non-derogable.375 Consequently, the court has no choice but to demand
reformulation of the law. The only question is whether the legislature will
pursue a bold plan or make the smallest possible changes to comply with the
law. The court here and EU human rights decisions from recent years suggest
that the time has come for a significant expansion of the rights afforded to
transsexuals and same-sex couples. The federal government could make these
changes with ease as it redraws the Transsexual Law, providing for true
equality in Germany. The larger changes would reach into more areas of the
law, including tax and inheritance matters, but such refinements of the law
would yield long-term benefits and they are fundamentally fair on
constitutional grounds.
The present case handles a relatively narrow class of individuals, but the
effects of the new legislation may have much greater ramifications than readily
apparent. Following the precedent set in this case, at least one additional
marriage will fall under the Transsexual Law in whatever form new legislation
assumes: a pastor in the evangelical church in Westfalen has stepped down to

371. See, e.g., Ivanka Savic & Per Lindström, PET and MRI Show Differences in Cerebral
Asymmetry and Functional Connectivity Between Homo- and Heterosexual Subjects, 105
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
9403, 9403 (2008), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2008/06/13/0801566105.full.
pdf+html. See also Vujovic et al., supra note 182.
372. See supra note 95.
373. The issue of appearances and same-sex marriages arises in the U.S. context, as well. See
Melissa Aubin, Comment, Defying Classification: Intestacy Issues for Transsexual Surviving
Spouses, 82 OR. L. REV. 1155, 1185 (2003).
374. Windel, supra note 103, at 78.
375. See supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text.
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live as a woman.376 His wife claims she will be staying with him.377 Beyond
such overlapping cases, however, the legislation could also affect same-sex
couples living in life partnerships and potentially even unmarried couples. The
ramifications are both personal and public, emotional and financial. In light of
the major stakes in this case, the legislators would do well to look carefully at
the direct and the indirect effects of their choices. The legal and cultural trends
described in this note suggest expanding rights on a broad basis. Hopefully
legislators will recognize these developments and act accordingly.
GREGORY A. KNOTT

376. Kath.Net–Katholische Nachrichten, Absurd: evangelischer Pfarrer will Frau werden,
Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.kath.net/detail.php?id=20879.
377. Peter Keller & Marcel Stepniak, Wie ist eine Ehe, wenn der Mann zur Frau wird?, Bild
Zeitung, September 19, 2008, http://www.bild.de/BILD/news/vermischtes/2008/09/19/gespraechmit-der-frau-des-transsexuellen-pfarrers/wie-ist-die-ehe.html.
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